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ESSENTIALISM
With each object comes a twofold distinction among properties: 
on the one side are the properties the object possesses, and on the 
other are the ones it lacks. The *essentialist* is someone who 
maintains a further distinction among properties of the first sort, 
counting certain of these 'essential' to their bearer and the rest 
only 'accidental'. The hard part is to explain what 'essential' means. 
By all accounts, a thing's essential properties are the ones 
it needs to possess to be the thing it is. But this can be taken in 
several ways. Traditionally it was held that F is essential to x iff 
to be F is part of 'what x is', as elucidated in x's definition (see 
ARISTOTLE). Since the 1950s, however, this *definitional* conception 
of essence has been losing ground to the *modal* conception: x is 
essentially F iff necessarily, whatever is x possesses F; 
equivalently, x must be F to exist at all (see NECESSITY). Another 
approach, not discussed here, conceives x's essential properties as 
those underlying and accounting for the bulk of its other properties 
(see LOCKE). This entry emphasises the modal conception of 
essentiality.  
Acquiescence in *some* form of the essential/accidental 
distinction appears to be implicit in the very practice of 
metaphysics. For what interests the metaphysician is not just any old 
feature of a thing, but the properties that make it the thing it is. 
So much is to say that the essential/ accidental distinction helps to 
demarcate the subject matter of metaphysics. But it also constitutes a 
part of that subject matter. If objects have certain of their 
properties in a specially fundamental way, then this is a phenomenon 
of great metaphysical significance. 
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1 Antiessentialism
Essentialists have two basic commitments: to the essential/
accidental distinction as such, and to the existence of properties of 
both types. Accordingly there are two main schools of 
antiessentialism. *Skeptical* antiessentialists reject the very idea 
of essential vs. accidental, while *trivializing* antiessentialists 
insist that all or nearly all properties fall on the same side of the 
line.   
Skeptics typically argue as follows. Whether x is essentially  
F is supposed to turn on whether it is *necessary* that x be F.  But 
this leads to contradictions. Is nine essentially greater than seven? 
Yes, because nine is seven plus two, and it is necessary that seven 
plus two exceeds seven. Yet also no, for nine is the number of 
planets, and it need not have been that the numbers of planets 
exceeded seven.  The only way out is to admit that nothing is 
essentially F *as such* but only as described in a certain way. So-
called 'essential' properties are really just properties entailed by 
some currently salient description. 
What ought to make us suspicious is that similar worries can 
be raised about intuitively quite innocent distinctions, such as that 
between a thing’s *constant* properties -- those that it *always* 
possesses -- and its *temporary* ones. While it is always the case 
that seven plus two exceeds seven, the number of planets was (let's 
imagine) once six. Described one way, then, nine is constantly greater 
than seven, while described another it is only temporarily greater 
than seven. 
Here the fallacy seems clear. For purposes of assessing 
constancy, 'it is always the case that the D is F' must be read *de 
re*: 'concerning the object which is in fact the D, *it* is always F.' 
Read *de re*, the objector's claim that at one time the number of 
planets was six is simply false. Mightn't a similar response be 
available to the essentialist?  It certainly might, *unless* the 
skeptic can convince us that *de re* modal talk is less intelligible 
than its temporal analogue. 
Skeptics have tried, complaining that there is nothing on the 
modal side to match our well-developed criteria of identity over time. 
But since the latter criteria have clear transworld implications (that 
a thing can evolve in thus and such ways shows it to be capable of 
thus and such otherworldly careers), it is hard to motivate an 
invidious distinction here. Anyway, few essentialists would grant the 
skeptic's assumption that without transworld identity criteria, *de 
re* modal discourse becomes emptied of content. If anything, content 
flows in the other direction; to call a counterfactual object 
identical to x is just to say that its properties are *ipso facto* 
properties x *could* have possessed.   
Now let's turn to the trivializer's claim that all,or nearly 
all, of a thing’s properties are accidental; or else that all, or 
nearly all, are essential. The second idea seems to be present in 
Leibniz, who holds that Adam would not have existed had Peter not gone 
on to deny Christ some thousands of years after his death. (Even today 
one encounters it in remarks like 'if the pistol had been equipped 
with a silencer, a death would have resulted, but not the *same* 
death.') This 'superessentialism' is often backed by a strikingly 
unconvincing line of argument, viz. that the indiscernibility of 
identicals rules out a possible x differing from our actual x in any 
way. (See G.E. Moore, 'External and Internal Relations', for a 
devastating critique.)  Anyway the other style of trivialization is 
far more common. 
Not every property can be accidental, because it is sometimes 
necessary just as a matter of logic that x be F. So, for every x 
whatsoever, logic tells us that x is round if round. Since what logic 
tells us is necessary, *being round if round* is essential to x. But 
perhaps the trivializer will try to draw the line at these *logically 
essential* properties, counting all other properties accidental.   
Such an approach will seem more trivializing than it is if one 
supposes that a property logically essential to one thing is thereby 
logically essential to everything. *Identity with x* is the obvious 
counterexample; it is logically necessary that x = x but not that y = 
x, so *identity with x* comes out essential to x alone. 
Now though it becomes hard not to allow additional properties 
as essential. Without accidental identity, for example, how can there 
be accidental distinctness?  Apparently then nine, in addition to 
being essentially identical to nine, should be reckoned essentially 
distinct from seven. But to be identical to seven, another *number* 
after all, would seem to be *less* contrary to nine's nature than to 
be an entirely different *kind* of thing, such as a painting or 
person.  Once we recognize non-membership in these *other* kinds as 
essential to nine, there seems little point in refusing to count it 
essentially a member of its *actual* kind, that is, essentially a 
number. By this point, we have shed our former colors and taken on a 
modest and unassuming essentialism.  
2   Grades of Essential Involvement 
Nearly all essentialists regard at least kind-properties as 
essential: Aristotle is essentially human, the set of horses is 
essentially a set, 'Cow's Skull' is essentially a painting, and so on. 
But it is common to go further and conceive a thing’s kind as the key 
to its essential properties more generally.  The simplest version of 
this 'priority of kinds' doctrine maintains that (ignoring identity-
properties and other such trivia) the essential properties of a K are 
first, to be a K, and second, whatever being a K entails. Thus while 
Ks have different essences than things of other kinds, between 
themselves all Ks are essentially alike.  
Yet there might be reasons for allowing essential differences 
*within* a kind. Doesn't each set, for instance, have its specific 
membership essentially, and isn't each painting essentially due to its 
actual painter?  Such a view may seem at odds with the the priority of 
kinds doctrine; but the conflict is only superficial, for we can 
understand a thing’s kind to dictate, not the essentiality of this or 
that specific property, but the essentiality of its properties of such 
and such *types*, whatever those properties may in fact be. So, Kripke 
proposes that a person essentially derives from whatever gametes she 
in fact derives from. 'How could a person originating from different 
parents, from a totally different sperm and egg, be *this very 
woman*?' Again, 'could *this table* have been made from a completely 
*different* block of wood, or even of water cleverly hardened into 
ice...?'  It could not and so the table essentially originated in 
*this* block of wood or one sufficiently like it. 
Now that we are countenancing essential differences among 
conspecifics, we might wonder how deep these differences run; indeed 
whether each object emerges with a uniquely identifying modal profile.  
By an *individual essence* of x, let's mean a collection of properties 
such that 
 
 (a) necessarily, whatever has these properties is x, and 
 (b) necessarily, whatever is x has these properties. 
The second clause asks for properties necessitated by *identity with 
x*, that is, properties essential to x. But where shall we look for 
properties with the further feature, demanded by the first clause, 
that to possess them is *sufficient* for identity with x?  Of course, 
the property of *identity with x* handles the job easily. But a 
property whose identity itself depends on x's seems ill-suited to the 
task of singling x out. Thus our problem becomes one of finding 
individual essences untainted by identity-properties and similar 
trivia. Essentialists of an Aristotelian bent call this impossible:  
      to make clear which thing a thing is, it is not enough       
      (*pace* the friends of the logically particularized 
      essence) to say however lengthily that it is *such*, or 
      *so and so*. 
Opposing this pessimism are, first, the Carnapian strategy of 
specifying x's identity through a world-by-world catalogue of its 
properties, and second, Forbes's idea of identifying it as the unique 
entity of its kind originating in a certain way from certain other 
entities (its members if x is a set, its original matter if x is an 
artefact, its gametes if x is an organism, and so on).    
Note that the second approach does not offer to identify 
objects in purely qualitative terms, but only in terms of prior 
objects. This is not objectionable in itself but it does leave a 
puzzle about items to which nothing is prior, say, coexistent eternal 
particles of the same kind. How will their essences differ?  (Faced 
with a similar problem, Aquinas decided that each angel was a species 
unto itself.)  Proponents of the first approach can say that for each 
particle, there is a world where it exists all by itself. But since 
these worlds are not themselves distinguishable except in terms of 
their solitary inhabitants, this leaves us not much further ahead. 
Ultimately, then, the Aristotelian may have a point; at least some 
identity facts will have to be taken as primitive and unexplained.  
3  Essential Epistemology 
Kant famously remarked that experience tells us how a thing 
*is*, but not that the thing could not have been otherwise. If this is 
true, how do we discover essential properties?  
At least the outlines of an answer are set forth in Kripke's 
*Naming and Necessity*. Suppose that x's essential properties flow 
from its kind K in the following sense: x is essentially F iff x is F, 
and F is a type of property that Ks possess essentially if at all. 
Then to know x's essential properties, it would be enough to know (i) 
its kind, (ii) which types of properties things of that kind possess 
essentially, and (iii) which properties of those types x actually 
possesses.  
Can we claim access to this information? For at least many 
objects, it seems arguable that (ii) is knowable a priori and (iii) a 
posteriori. One knows a priori, for example, that paintings 
essentially derive from their actual painters, and a posteriori that 
Georgia O'Keefe painted 'Cow's Skull'. As for (i), the knowledge that 
'Cow's Skull' is a painting, this involves a priori and a posteriori 
factors working together. Experience reveals that 'Cow's Skull' has a 
certain history, internal makeup, and so on,  and it is a priori that 
these features suffice to make it a painting.  
4  Applications
      Apart from uses already mentioned, what is the essential/
accidental distinction good for?  From Descartes on, many have seen 
its potential as a counter to identity theses. The argument is simple. 
Identicals are indiscernible, so if x has a feature essentially that 
is at best accidental to y, then x and y are distinct. Allowing that 
my body is essentially extended and that I am not, it follows that I 
am distinct from my body. If the tree in the quad can exist without my 
idea of it, then since the same cannot be said of my idea, my idea is 
not the tree. 
Yet the argument might appear to prove too much. Imagine a 
statue that is always composed of the same hunk of clay, while the 
clay, for its part, always composes the statue. Given their 
overwhelming similarity, the statue and the clay might well seem 
identical. True, the statue is essentially humanoid in form while the 
clay would survive reshaping into a ball. But are we really to 
conclude, on the basis of such a subtle difference, that the statue 
and its clay are two distinct objects?  
So-called 'one-thingers' suspect a fallacy of equivocation. 
Putting 'the clay' for 'the statue' in 'the statue is essentially 
humanoid' alters its truth-value, all right, but is this due to a 
change in subject matter or a change in what is said about that 
subject matter? Perhaps the substitution works to deflect attention 
from the property of having humanoid *statue*-counterparts to that of 
having humanoid *clay*-counterparts. That two separate properties are 
involved removes the need for a distinction between the objects. (See 
COUNTERPART THEORY.)
'Two-thingers' urge us to accept the distinction while 
rethinking its significance. If objects as similar as a statue and its 
clay can fail to be identical, then non-identity is not *per se* a 
very powerful conclusion. This makes life harder for philosophers 
promoting substantive forms of dualism; they must now explain what 
beyond mere non-identity they intend, and what beyond merely essential 
differences they can offer as evidence. But life becomes easier for 
those struggling to understand the various intimate identity-*like* 
relations so important in recent metaphysics; for instance, the 
relations between material objects and their constitutive matter, 
between actions and their associated bodily movements, between mental 
states and the physical states that realize them, and between fine-
grained events occupying the same spatiotemporal region. The last 
example will be developed further since it sets up one final 
application of essentialism, to the problem of causation.  
What is the relation between the Titanic's sinking so swiftly 
and its sinking as such?  Both events were swift but only the first, 
arguably, *had* to be so. This comes out in the fact that the 
Titanic's sinking might have stretched out over days or weeks (suppose 
that certain hatches had held) whereas its *swiftly* sinking could not 
have been that prolonged. Of course it is not just in this respect 
that the events differ. That the hatches broke was crucial to the 
ship's swiftly sinking, but no factor at all in its sinking as such; 
and we can imagine that it was the ship's sinking as such (not its 
sinking so swiftly) that led to the navigator's dismissal. Is this 
only happenstance or can we find a theory of causation capable of 
'predicting' the events' causal differences on the basis of their 
essential ones?  A counterfactual theory looks promising since the 
conditions under which an event would not have occurred are visibly 
sensitive to its essential properties. 
5  Conceptions of essentiality
To this point we've been understanding an essential property 
of x as a property that x cannot exist without. But although this is 
the going conception of essentiality, even its advocates admit that it 
suffers from certain anomalies. The first and best-known concerns the 
property of existence. Since it's impossible to exist without 
existing, the modal conception extends to absolutely everything a 
compliment normally reserved for God, viz. essential existence. The 
problem arises because of the way we conditionalize on existence in 
the definition of an essential property. Suppose then that we drop the 
existence condition and define x's essential properties simply as the 
ones it  must possess, regardless of whether it exists or not. This 
has the desired effect of eliminating essential existence for 
contingent beings, but at a cost: no property presupposing existence 
can be essential to such beings either. So, since to be human one must 
exist, you and I are not essentially human; hence, perhaps, not human 
at all. 
Now to a second and deeper problem. A thing's essential 
properties are supposed to be the properties that make it the thing it 
is. But the modal conception has no way of distinguishing the 
properties that *make* x the thing it is from the ones it has as a 
necessary *result* of being that thing; it cannot distinguish the 
*conditions* of x's identity from the *consequences* of its identity. 
This is clearest in the case of universally necessary properties like 
that of *being an element if gold*, or *being such that 2+3=5*. 
Neither helps make Aristotle the thing he is, but since nothing can be 
Aristotle without them, the modal conception reckons them essential. 
Now consider Aristotle's not-universally-necessary property of being 
distinct from the Eiffel Tower. This is not a factor in Aristotle's 
identity, or to explain what Aristotle was, we would have to mention 
every other object, past, present and future. Nevertheless, the modal 
conception calls it essential to Aristotle to be distinct from the 
Eiffel Tower. A final example seems decisive. To go by the modal 
conception, Aristotle's membership in {Aristotle} is essential to man 
and set alike. But the truth is surely different: although it lies in 
the set's nature to contain the man, the man's membership in the set 
seems not a condition of his identity but a consequence of it. No 
purely modal account can deliver this result; the case presents no 
modal asymmetries whatever, hence none for a modal account to exploit. 
Troubled by these anomalies, Fine has urged a revival of the 
definitional conception of essence. With each object x, he associates 
a proposition D(x) to function as x's 'real definition'. The 
properties essential to x are those that can be assigned to it just on 
the basis of D(x), with no help from any other source. Assuming 
suitable definitions, this approach allows him to resist the unwelcome 
essential attributions of the last few paragraphs. Aristotle's 
definition makes no mention of the Eiffel Tower, so it cannot 
pronounce on the two objects' relations. Since {Aristotle}'s 
definition describes it as containing Aristotle, but not the other way 
around, their relationship will be essential to the set only. 
Not every modally essential property will be definitionally 
essential, but there is room for debate about the converse hypothesis. 
Suppose I make a statue out of the one hunk of clay in my studio. Then 
in defining the statue -- in explaining what it is -- I will say that 
it was created out of this hunk of clay. I will say this *despite* the 
fact that a distinct but sufficiently overlapping hunk would have 
resulted in the very same statue.  (In explaining what the statue 
*is*, why would I mention the various objects it *could* have been 
fashioned from?) So, *originating in this hunk of clay* looks like an 
example of a definitionally essential property that isn't modally 
essential. Yet it could equally be argued that since the statue did 
not *need* to originate in the given clay, originating in that clay is 
not a condition of identity with the statue; hence it should not be 
considered essential even on the definitional approach. 
Disputes like this forces a closer look at the phrase 
'conditions of identity with x'. Due to a familiar ambiguity in 
'condition', this can mean either the necessary *prerequisites* of 
identity with x (the properties a thing would have to have in order to 
be x); or the factors actually *constituting* its identity (the 
properties that x actually possesses by which it succeeds in being x). 
Deriving from this particular hunk of clay may not be *required* for 
identity with the statue, but it seems still to be essential in the 
constitutive sense. To have derived from the given clay is part of 
what it *is*, even if not part of what it *had* to be, to be that 
statue. 
So we end up with three conceptions of essential property, 
depending on whether x's essential properties are understood as (1) 
the necessary *prerequisites* of identity with x, (2) the factors 
actually *constituting* x's identity, or (3) the necessary 
*consequences* of being x.  (3) expresses the modal conception of 
essentiality. (2) is a fully de-modalized version of the definitional 
conception. (1) lies somewhere between; it is the definitional 
conception but with a modal twist. Each of the three seems worthy of 
further study. 
See also: ARISTOTLE, COUNTERPART THEORY, DEFINITION, DE RE AND DE 
DICTO, IDENTITY, LOCKE, MODAL LOGIC, NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY
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